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Abstract 
Recent years have witnessed increasing interest among international historians in the 
impact of emotions on foreign policy decisions, as part of a broader movement 
usually known as the ‘emotional turn.’ This is associated with findings, from the field 
of neuroscience, that cognition and emotion – rather than operating independently – 
are inextricably bound together in human decision-making Most work thus far has 
concentrated on American foreign policy since 1945, but this article broadens the 
focus to consider the impact of emotions on British decision-makers, especially 
Cabinet ministers, as they debated whether to go to war in 1914. It shows that, despite 
a tendency by the protagonists themselves to interpret their actions in rational terms, 
sufficient evidence of emotions can be found in the written record to allow a fresh 
approach to be taken to the July Crisis. While emotions must be seen as acting 
alongside rational mental processes, rather than regularly overpowering them, a focus 
on the subject helps explain different approaches taken by individual ministers, why 
the majority came to approve intervention in the conflict and how the Prime Minister, 
H. H. Asquith, partly by appearing to control his feelings, minimised resignations 
over the fateful decision. It also allows a new view to be taken of why the Cabinet 
decided to go to war on 4 August in defence of Belgium, despite deciding just a few 
days earlier that the question of fulfilling the 1839 guarantee of Belgian neutrality was 
‘one of policy than of legal obligation.’  
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Recent years have witnessed interest among some international historians in the 
impact of emotions on policy. This is part of a broader movement, the so-called 
‘emotional turn’, that has impacted on a range of disciplines. It is encouraged by 
neuroscientific findings that cognition and emotion – rather than operating 
independently – are inextricably linked in the brain’s decision-making, a process one 
article has dubbed ‘cogmotion.’1  While individuals might believe they take decisions 
after carefully weighing options, the fact is that powerful feelings – like anger, fear, 
hope, resentment – also shape their choices. The argument is that, rather than 
dismissing them as irrational and primitive, ‘By studying emotions, we can find out 
much more about human motives, about what triggers actions…, about what 
influences decisions…’2 Given that emotions are integral to decision-making, they 
cannot simply be ignored. This is not to say that emotions outweigh rational thinking, 
though in certain in certain, critical situations they might – as when fear leads 
someone to jump away from a snake. Rather, as decisions are considered, emotions 
and reason will interact.3  
 
                                                 
Unless otherwise stated, all dates in the footnotes are to the year 1914. 
 
1 Douglas Barnett and Hilary Ratner, ‘The Organization and Integration of Cognition and Emotion in 
Development’, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, No. 67 (1997), 303-16. 
2 Ute Frevert, in Forum, ‘History of Emotions’, German History, Vol.28, No.1 (2010), 68. For 
introductions to the ‘emotional turn’ in History: Nicole Eustace et al, ‘AHR Conversation: the 
Historical Study of Emotions’, American Historical Review, Vol. 117, No. 5 (Dec. 2012), 1487-1530; 
Jan Plamper, The History of Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
3 See Carroll Izard, ‘Emotion Theory and Research’, Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 60 (2009), 5-
8. 
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Frank Costigliola, the leading figure in the field of emotions and international 
history, has demonstrated how the emotions of key officials, like George Kennan, 
helped sour US-Soviet relations at the dawn of the Cold War. William Leogrande 
concludes that, in 1959-60, ‘the intense emotional response of US policymakers to 
Fidel Castro’s anti-American rhetoric led them to conclude that co-existence with 
[Cuba’s] revolutionary government was impossible, even before Castro took policy 
decisions that seriously threatened US interests.’ And Barbara Keys points out that, 
although Secretary of State Henry Kissinger posed as an arch-realist, he was also 
given to temper tantrums, jealousy and self-doubt; his sense of ‘betrayal’ by Moscow 
may have contributed to US-Soviet confrontation during the 1973 Middle East War.4 
This article considers the possible impact of emotions on British decision-makers 
during the July Crisis, especially Cabinet ministers. The views of civil servants, 
especially in the Foreign Office, were also influential in decision-making, but they 
tended to favour intervention in the First World war, whereas there was intense debate 
between ministers, in whose hands the final decision lay.  
 
Emotion may be defined as a ‘strong feeling’ or an ‘intuitive feeling as 
distinguished from reasoning or knowledge.’5 Emotions are more powerfully felt than 
longer-terms ‘moods’ and may lead to rapid decision-making, based on ‘gut’ instincts.  
They ‘typically arise when one evaluates an event or outcome as relevant for one’s 
concerns or preferences… One cannot simply choose to have or not have 
                                                 
4 Frank Costigliola, ‘After Roosevelt’s Death: dangerous emotions, divisive discourses and the 
abandoned alliance’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 34, No.1 (2010), 1-23; William Leogrande, ‘Anger, anti-
Americanism and the break in U.S.-Cuban relations’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 41, No.1 (2017), 105; 
Barbara Keys, ‘Henry Kissinger: the emotional statesman’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2011), 
587-609. 
5 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/emotion (accessed 23 June 2017). 
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emotions…’6 It will be argued, here, that focusing on them helps explain different 
approaches taken by individual ministers, how the majority came to approve 
intervention in the war and how the Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith, minimised 
resignations over that fateful decision. Ultimately, emotions should be blended with 
work on ‘rational’ decision-making, to reflect the fact that both form part of human 
decision-making, but here the focus is on the former, because they have not 
previously been treated seriously and their potential significance deserves to be 
emphasised. The article will begin by showing how almost all existing accounts, not 
only by academics, but also by policy-makers themselves, see the decision for war in 
rational terms. But it then argues that, while decision-makers interpreted their own 
actions in rational terms, references to emotions seep into the written record with 
surprising frequency, not least because ministers were under immense psychological 
strain as war approached. It goes on to show how such an emotional atmosphere 
impacted on the course of events: how special respect was given to leading ministers 
who demonstrated strong emotional control, including Asquith and the Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Edward Grey; how emotionally-charged appeals to honour and loyalty 
helped minimise resignations from the government over the eventual decision for war; 
and how rising anger over German behaviour helped push the Cabinet to go to war in 
defence of Belgian neutrality. 
 
The Primacy of Rationalism 
Emotions have been mentioned in previous accounts of the 1914 crisis. In the early 
twentieth century, one analyst recognised, ‘the danger of war proceeds mainly from 
                                                 
6 Marcel Zeelenberg et al, ‘On emotion specificity in decision making’, Judgment and Decision 
Making, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2008), 20. 
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the temper of the people, which, when aroused, disregards self-interest…’7 and there 
is a persistent idea that emotions mattered at a popular level. Thus, it has been said 
Germany’s invasion of Belgium ‘proved to be a catalyst which unleashed the many 
emotions, rationalisation and glorifications of war which had long been part of the 
British climate of opinion.’8 Detailed studies of ‘war enthusiasm’ in 1914, however, 
have concluded that this phenomenon has been exaggerated.9 Where elite policy-
makers are concerned comments on emotion tend to be in passing remarks, like Pierre 
Renouvin’s belief that Germany’s ‘violation of Belgian neutrality produced in… 
English people the wave of emotion which made… intervention possible’, or 
Christopher Clark’s recognition that, in Cabinet on 2 August, Grey, declared ‘with 
great emotion that Britain had a moral obligation to support France…’10  
 
Aside from some recent works (discussed below) on the concept of ‘honour’, 
however, such remarks are not followed by sustained analysis of emotions. Instead, 
these are treated as a short-term disturbance to ‘normal’, rational thinking, as with the 
assertion that, in Austria-Hungary, following the assassination of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand, which sparked the crisis, ‘Once the shock had subsided… actions were 
once again based on deliberation…’ or Clark’s comment that, ‘with emotions running 
high’ in early August, there was ‘a heightening and polarization of utterance that may 
                                                 
7 Alfred Thayer Mahan (1912), quoted in M.S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919 
(London: Longman, 1993), 277. 
8 Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (Second edition, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), 248. 
9 For example, Jeffrey Verhey, The Spirit of 1914: militarism, myth and mobilization in Germany 
(Cambridge University Press, 2000); Michael Neiberg, Dance of the Furies: Europe and the outbreak 
of World War One (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); Catriona Pennell, A Kingdom 
United: popular responses to the outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland (Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
10 Pierre Renouvin, The Immediate Origins of the War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928), 
298.; Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: how Europe went to war in 1914 (London: Penguin, 2013), 
543. 
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lead us to misread the underlying realities of the situation.’11 A rare exception is 
William Jannen who, in a 1983 essay, paid attention to ‘accumulating stress and fears’ 
in Austria before Sarajevo and discussed ‘emotional posture’, but his primary focus 
was on psychological influences.12 In the international relations literature, too, 
rational actor models have dismissed emotional factors. Analysing outbreaks of wars 
in 1941, Theodore Abel rather arrogantly insisted that, ‘The decision to fight… is 
based upon a careful weighing of chances… In no case is the decision precipitated by 
emotional tensions…’ (italics added). In 1965, Ole Holsti discussed the effect of stress 
upon policy-makers in 1914, yet barely mentioned emotions. A generation later, Jack 
Levy judged the war was caused by ‘the underlying international and domestic forces 
which shaped the preferences of the great powers...’13  
 
One difficulty for researchers is that policy-makers themselves have usually 
assumed that ‘thinking’ is more important than ‘feeling’ and, therefore, defend their 
actions on rational grounds in their correspondence, diaries and memoirs. Among 
British ministers reluctantly won over to war in 1914, Charles Hobhouse, the 
Postmaster-General, claimed he ‘did not want Germany to destroy us in detail as I 
believe she hoped to do’; Walter Runciman, President of the Board of Agriculture, 
believed ‘we could not tolerate the German fleet in the English Channel’; and 
Reginald McKenna, the Home Secretary, had ‘no doubt… we were committed to 
                                                 
11 Manfred Rauchensteiner, The First World War and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy (Vienna: 
Böhlau Verlag, 2014), 90; Clark, Sleepwalkers, 541. 
12 William Jannen, ‘The Austro-Hungarian Decision for War’, in Samuel Williamson and Peter Pastor, 
eds., Essays on World War I (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1983), 69 and 74. 
13 Theodore Abel, ‘The Elements of Decision in the Pattern of War’, American Sociological Review, 
Vol.6, No.6 (1941), 858; Ole Holsti, ‘The 1914 Case’, American Political Science Review, Vol.59, 
No.2 (1965), 365-78; Jack Levy, ‘Preferences, Constraints and Choices in July 1914’ International 
Security, Vo.15, No.3 (Winter 1990/91), 154. 
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France…’14 The Earl of Beauchamp, the First Commissioner of Works – who 
submitted his resignation over the war, then withdrew it – insisted, ‘I remained 
because I thought… great British interests were at stake...’ while the local government 
minister, Herbert Samuel, feared a Cabinet split would lead to the creation of a 
Coalition or a Conservative administration, ‘either of which would certainly have 
been a war ministry.’15 
 
The tendency for ministers to explain their behaviour in rational terms is 
evident across the board, despite deep differences in outlook over the crisis. The three 
who resigned also justified themselves in these terms: Lord Morley, Lord President of 
the Council, warned Asquith that, ‘To swear ourselves to France is to bind ourselves 
to Russia’, with its autocratic regime; John Burns, President of the Board of Trade, 
feared that, if Britain committed itself to defend the French coast from a German 
naval attack, Berlin could be justified in declaring war; and Charles Trevelyan, a 
junior education minister (outside Cabinet), complained the entente cordiale with 
France had been turned into an alliance, a ‘policy I believe to have been wrong.’16 
Significantly, references to emotions tended to made by politicians only in a negative 
sense, when criticising opponents. Thus, Samuel claimed those who resigned made a 
‘subjective rather than objective’ decision, ‘due less to a judgement on the merits of 
the case’ than ‘a feeling’ they could not preside over a war; whereas Trevelyan 
condemned Grey’s speech of 3 August, the government’s key public statement in 
                                                 
14 British Library, London, John Burns papers, Add. Mss. 46303, Hobhouse to Burns, 7 August; British 
Library, J.A. Spender papers, Add. Mss. 46386, Runciman to Spender, 4 November 1929, and 
McKenna to Spender, 8 May 1929. 
15 Bodleian Library, Oxford, John Morley papers, Ms.Eng.d.3585, Beauchamp to Morley, 6 August; 
Bernard Wasserstein, Herbert Samuel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 163. 
16 Morley to Asquith, 4 August, in Viscount Morley, Memorandum on Resignation (London: 
Macmillan, 1928), 31; Wasserstein, Samuel, 162; Newcastle University Library, Walter Runciman 
Papers, WR135, Trevelyan to Runciman, 4 August. 
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favour of intervention, for its ‘bare-faced appeal to passion…’ Yet, Grey was keen to 
defend himself from accusations of emotionalism: he did not intend ‘to stir 
indignation, and the House ought to come to its decisions on grounds of weight, not of 
passion.’17  
 
This insistence that decisions were rationally-based, married to criticism of 
any signs of emotion, is unsurprising. In 1914, government ministers were all males: 
emotional outbursts were associated with weak, feminine behaviour. For one one 
Labour M.P., listening to Grey’s speech, ‘the atmosphere soon resembled that of a 
hysterical meeting of excited ladies, rather than that of a parliamentary debate on 
which the lives and happiness of millions depended.’18 Men were supposed to 
demonstrate bravery, resilience and self-control, and both sides of the debate sought 
to act within these expectations. Samuel warned his wife, ‘We nineteen men round the 
table at Downing St. may soon have to face the most momentous problem which men 
can face’, while Lord Haldane, the Lord Chancellor, told his sister, ‘I must put all 
other thoughts aside & try to play a man’s part.’19 They were not the only ones to link 
strength and masculinity in interpreting their own approach to the crisis. In seeking to 
dissuade Trevelyan from resignation, Runciman argued that three sceptics about 
intervention – Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George, Colonial Secretary 
Lewis Harcourt and education minister Jack Pease – had decided ‘our duty – and each 
man alone can decide for himself – is to remain where we are, and with our full 
                                                 
17 Herbert Samuel, Memoirs (London: Cresset Press, 1945), 104; Newcastle University Library, 
Charles Trevelyan Papers, CPT59, ‘Personal record of the days that led up to the war’; Viscount Grey, 
Twenty-Five Years, Volume II (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1925), 14. 
18 J.R. Clynes, Memoirs, 1869-1924 (London: Hutchinson, 1937), 168-9. 
19 Parliamentary Archives, Herbert Samuel papers, A/156/691, Herbert to Beatrice Samuel, 29 July; 
National Library of Scotland (NLS), Edinburgh, Richard Haldane papers, MS.5991, Haldane to his 
Sister, 2 August. 
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strength devote ourselves to the terrible work…’20 This is not to say that women were 
immune to ideals of duty or feelings of excitement over war. The practice of sending 
white feathers to men who failed to enlist is well known and Margot Asquith, wife of 
the Prime Minister, could not understand why the Attorney-General, Sir John Simon, 
considered resignation: ‘what a fool he wd. have been to have left politics at the most 
wonderful time in history!’21 
 
The Presence of Emotions 
No-one should really be surprised that references to emotions are found in the 
historical record but, as Ute Frevert points out, until recently, while historians ‘all saw 
the power of emotions in politics, in daily life, in social movements… [u]nfortunately, 
they were all Cartesians – dismissing emotions… as something primitive and 
irrational.’22 It might be expected that the claims they made to rationalism, as well as 
their tendency to dismiss or criticise decisions based on emotions, would have led 
politicians to minimise references them in their accounts, thus making it difficult for 
historians to uncover trace their impact. But, a trawl of memoirs, diaries and letters in 
fact reveals abundant evidence those at the centre of events were passionately affected 
by the crisis, which unfolded with astonishing speed.23 On 29 July, the day after 
Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, King George V wrote, ‘please God it will 
not come. These are very anxious days for me to live in.’ Henry Wickham Steed, 
foreign editor of The Times, called 1 August, the day Germany declared war on 
Russia, ‘the most terrible day of my life.’ For Maurice Hankey, a senior civil servant, 
                                                 
20 Runciman Papers, WR 135, Runciman to Trevelyan, 4 August. 
21 Nicoletta Gullace, ‘White Feathers and Wounded Men: female patriotism and the memory of the 
Great War’, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1997), 178-206; Bodleian Library, Lewis 
Harcourt papers, Ms. Harcourt 421, Margot Asquith to Harcourt, 14 August. 
22 Frevert, ‘History of Emotions’, 68. 
23 Recent accounts include: Clark, Sleepwalkers; Thomas Otte, July Crisis (Cambridge University 
Press, 1914); Gordon Martel, The Month that Changed the World (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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the following few days, culminating in Britain’s declaration of war on 4 August, 
‘blurred in my recollection except that the pressure of work was continuous, and that 
my sleep (at the office) was much disturbed…’24  
 
It could be no different for Cabinet ministers, especially, as Augustine Birrell, 
Chief Secretary for Ireland, said, ‘No occurrence can ever be so disheartening… to a 
Liberal Government… as the outbreak of an European war…’ There was also the fact 
that the war crisis overlapped with fears of civil war in Ireland, where trouble had 
been brewing for months. Already, on 27 July, Haldane told his mother, ‘This is the 
most trying time, I think, we have had since the Ministry was formed.’ Futhermore, 
by 31 July, rumours of war had triggered a financial crisis and Harcourt recorded 
Lloyd George’s report to Cabinet in almost apocalyptic terms: 
Gov[ernor] of Bank of England & all City opinion aghast at any possibility of 
our being dragged in. Business men in North say if we were, all mills, factorys 
[sic], mines, shipping etc. stopped… One man s[ai]d to him… “England will 
be in revolution in a week.” 
The next day, meetings were continuous: the morning Cabinet ended at 1 p.m., but 
Harcourt and several other ministers then met to discuss finance and did not expect to 
break up until midnight; another Cabinet was fixed for 11 a.m. the following 
morning.25  
 
                                                 
24 The King quoted in Catrine Clay, King, Kaiser, Tsar: three royal cousins who led the world to war 
(London: John Murray, 2006), 307; Henry Wickham Steed, Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922, Volume 
II (London: Heinemann, 1924), 10; Lord Hankey, The Supreme Command, 1914-18, Volume I 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961), 161. 
25 Augustine Birrell, Things Past Redress (London: Faber, 1937), 224; Haldane papers, MS.5991, 
Haldane to his Mother, 27 July; Harcourt papers, Ms.Eng.c.8269, Political Journal [hereafter Harcourt 
Journal], 31 July, and Ms.Eng.d.4192, Lewis to Mary Ethel Harcourt, 1 August. 
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The cumulative effect of a multifaceted crisis and days of meetings inevitably 
had a draining effect, which heightened emotions and was, in fact, readily 
acknowledged by ministers. In his memoirs, in a remark little-noticed by historians, 
Grey acknowledged, ‘so much working of the mind is subconscious rather than 
conscious’ and that one element in decision-making in 1914 was its ‘immense strain.’ 
On 4 August, as diplomatic crisis gave way to war, Runciman wrote of having gone 
through ‘ten days of anxiety and torturing thought…’ Similarly, Winston Churchill, 
First Lord of the Admiralty, remembered these as days of ‘stress and convulsion.’26  
Such emotions also had a physical effect. Harcourt’s Private Secretary noted, ‘I will 
never forget his appearance at 6 o’clock on the evening of 4 August. He was 
absolutely worn out, and looked like death.’ Haldane’s sister recorded him and Grey 
as suffering sleeplessness and indigestion in the face of ‘immense strain.’27 The 
stressful atmosphere also made it hard to keep a balanced view: Beauchamp admitted, 
‘It is very difficult to sit down calmly in the middle of a crisis to record events as they 
fly by.’ Aside from being busy and tired, ministers were tormented by the prospect 
war might somehow be avoided, as reflected in Haldane’s remark, ‘I shall not give up 




If it is accepted that ministers were under great emotional strain, what evidence is 
there that this may have impacted on British decision-making? International historians 
                                                 
26 Grey, Twenty-Five Years, II, 1 and 10; Runciman Papers, WR135, Runciman to Trevelyan, 4 
August; Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, Volume I (London: Odhams, 1938), 184. 
27 R.R. James, Memoirs of a Conservative: J.C.C. Davidson’s papers, 1910-37 (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1969), 20; NLS, Elizabeth Haldane papers, Ms. 20240, diary, 8 August. 
28 Peter Raina, The Seventh Earl of Beauchamp (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2016), 310; Haldane papers, 
MS.5991, Haldane to his Mother, 1 August. 
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have generally shown little interest in the linguistic and cultural ‘turns’ and, as Laura 
McEnaney says, are still ‘quite focused on decisive moments and pivotal people.’29 
But these ‘pivotal people’ were undoubtedly affected by emotions in taking decisions. 
Several scholars involved in the broader ‘emotional turn’ have stressed the 
importance of biography to the study of emotions. From an anthropological 
perspective, Andrew Beatty contends that, while emotions ‘might be third-person 
constructions, a collective product, they are first-person experiences… Their 
particularity is to do with their subjectivity…’ Michael Roper has warned gender 
historians against an approach in which the ‘varied emotional experiences that 
constitute the domain of subjectivity are flattened into a version of collective 
consciousness…’30 The psychologist Carroll Izard has proposed that emotions should 
be divided into two types: ‘basic emotions’ (most obviously, the response to suddenly 
encountering a snake, when the emotion of fear may well decide the reaction, with 
reason having no time to be engaged); and ‘emotion schemas’(when emotions have 
time to ‘interact dynamically with perceptual and cognitive processes…’, which 
would be more usual during a crisis that stretched over several days, as in July 1914). 
Izard, too, then emphasises the link between emotions and biography, arguing that 
motion schemas are ‘influenced by individual differences, learning, and social and 
cultural contexts’ and may lead to ‘emotion traits’ in individuals.31 International 
historians may be attracted to an approach that not only allows them to maintain an 
emphasis on particular actors, but also encourages them to deepen their understanding 
of these individuals by exploring their emotional make-up. 
                                                 
29 Laura McEnaney, ‘Personal, Political and International: a reflection on diplomacy and 
methodology’, Diplomatic History Vol. 36, No. 4 (2012), 772. 
30 For example: Andrew Beatty, ‘Anthropology and Emotion’ Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2014), 551; Michael Roper, ‘Slipping out of View: subjectivity and emotion 
in gender history’, History Workshop Journal, Issue 59 (2005), 59. 
31 Izard, ‘Emotion Theory’, 8-9. 
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The first point to make here is that, in such a charged situation, respect went to 
those individuals who retained their self-control, not least Asquith. Several ministers 
commented on the calm that he demonstrated, even at the most trying points. When, 
on 1 August, Churchill asked him to approve naval mobilisation in the face of Cabinet 
doubts, ‘The Prime Minister simply… looked at me and said no word… [I] sustained 
the impression that he would not put out a finger to stop me.’ Before the next Cabinet, 
Lloyd George and Harcourt warned Asquith they ‘represented 8-10 colleagues who 
w[oul]d not go to war for Belgium’, but he simply ‘listened, s[ai]d nothing.’ Over 
lunch at Downing Street on 2 August, following the most difficult Cabinet of the 
crisis, Pease felt ‘there was a forced effort at cheerfulness’, but the Prime Minister 
was ‘most natural… we discussed word derivation & the soundness of Dryden’s 
English…’32 It is clear from other ministers’ comments that such sangfroid won 
Asquith respect. The same day, Edwin Montagu, a junior Treasury minister, wrote, 
‘Panic follows panic… hopes vanish and revive only to be dashed again – nothing but 
blackness ahead… the marvellous calmness of the PM is our only national asset’, 
while Charles Masterman, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, felt Asquith ‘acted 
with great dexterity and good temper’ throughout the crisis.33 This may help to 
explain why most ministers remained loyal to the Prime Minister and shrank from 
resignation, a point that will be discussed further below. 
 
                                                 
32 Parliamentary Archives, Lord Beaverbrook papers, BBK/C/86, Churchill to Beaverbrook, 18 March 
1928; Harcourt Journal, 2 August; K.M. Wilson, ed., ‘The Cabinet Diary of J.A. Pease, 24 July-5 
August 1914’, Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (1983) [hereafter Pease 
diary], 9. 
33 Trinity College, Cambridge, Edwin Montagu papers, II C 1/118, Montagu to Mother, 2 August; Lord 
Riddell, War Diary (London: Ivor Nicholson, 1933), 6. 
 14 
The other main figure at the epicentre of debate was Grey. Later accused by 
Lloyd George of ‘a temperamental failure’ in 1914, he won plaudits at the time from 
his colleagues (including the Chancellor) for calmness and responsibility.34 Haldane 
recorded on 29 July that Grey was ‘marvellously cool and concentrated’, while 
Samuel remarked, ‘It is marvellous how serene, and indeed cheerful, he keeps.’ Even 
John Burns, President of the Board of Trade, who felt war ‘a universal crime’ and 
resigned over it, commented on 1 August, ‘Grey wears well under the sustained 
pressure.’35 Edmund Gosse, the literary critic, saw Grey on 2 August, finding him 
‘perfectly calm, but grave to solemnity…’ As if to exhibit his self-control, the Foreign 
Secretary ‘took the motor, and went off to the Zoo, to spend an hour among the 
birds.’36 Having negotiated the difficult Cabinets of the 2nd, Grey faced the House of 
Commons on the 3rd. His Parliamentary Private Secretary, Arthur Murray, 
considered, ‘It was the supreme moment of his life and he rose to it magnificently.’ 
The speech served to ease the emotions of Grey’s fellow-interventionists. While 
Trevelyan, as seen above, condemned the speech’s ‘bare-faced… passion’, Hobhouse 
believed its ‘sincerity, exhibiting the depth of feeling of the speaker, contributed 
greatly to the effect it had on its audience.’37 There is evidence that Grey was less 
steady than he appeared. When American Ambassador Walter Page saw him on 28 
July, ‘he looked 10 years older than he looked a month ago’38 and Runciman later 
judged that, although Asquith ‘never lost the regularity of his stride’, Grey ‘nearly 
                                                 
34 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, Volume I (London: Odhams, 1938), 58-60; Trevor Wilson, ed., 
The Political Diaries of C.P. Scott, 1911-28 (London: Collins, 1970), 99. 
35 Haldane papers, MS.5991, Haldane to his Mother, 29 July; Richard Haldane, An Autobiography 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1929), 273; Samuel papers, A/156/692, Herbert to Beatrice Samuel, 
30 July; Burns papers, Add. Mss. 46336, diary, 27 July and 1 August. 
36 Evan Charteris, The Life and Letters of Sir Edmund Gosse (London: Heinemann, 1931), pp. 366-68. 
37 National Library of Scotland, Murray of Elibank papers, MS.8814, diary, 3 August; David, ed. 
Asquith’s Cabinet, 180. 
38 Arthur Link, ed., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Volume 30, May-September 1914 (Princeton 
University Press, 1979), 314-16. 
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broke under the strain…’39  Grey’s memoirs suggest, however, that his nerves only 
gave way with the coming of war:  ‘responsibility elevates when it does not crush. But 
when… the hope of peace was gone, the strain was felt more severely.’40 
 
Whilst an image of stability could only help Asquith and Grey command 
respect during the crisis, it is also evident that signs of emotional instability drew 
criticism. Harcourt was especially critical of Lloyd George and Churchill for 
volatility. In Cabinet on 27 July he had found both belligerent. Two days later, 
however, Lloyd George seemed to be ‘in full flight to us (Peace party) … Winston 
also less bellicose, also wants to be on popular side… but these popularity hunters not 
to be trusted.’ Runciman, too, found the Chancellor ‘vacillating… Right up to tea-
time on Sunday, August 2, he told us that he was doubtful of the action he would 
take.’41 Lloyd George provoked less concern than Churchill, however. By 30 July, 
Harcourt feared he ‘has gone mad’ and the following day felt ‘Winston very angry – 
overwrought & excitable.’ Pease, too, judged Churchill to be ‘bellicose and 
aggressive.’42 Following the morning Cabinet of 2 August, the Prime Minister’s 
daughter, Violet, found ‘Winston alone was buoyant…’ and Masterman accused 
Churchill of exhibiting ‘light-hearted irresponsibility’ in discussing war.43 Churchill 
was troubled by his own excitement, telling his wife, ‘Everything tends towards 
catastrophe and collapse. I am interested, geared up and happy. Is it not horrible to be 
built like that?’ Yet, however disturbing his enthusiasm, his very emotional 
                                                 
39 Runciman Papers, WR136/18, Runciman to Chalmers, 17 February 1915. 
40 Grey, Twenty-Five Years, II, 12. 
41 Harcourt Journal, 29 July; Arthur Murray, Master and Brother (London: John Murray, 1945), 120 
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The emotional biography of individuals seems to have had a significant impact on 
whether Cabinet ministers, who initially undertook to resign over war, actually went 
through with this threat. The two who did resign – Burns and Morley – were clearly at 
ease with their eventual decision, as was Trevelyan, the one non-Cabinet minister to 
go. True, Hobhouse’s diary suggests that Burns, who had long been suspicious of 
British ties to France, was in considerable turmoil before becoming the first to depart, 
on 2 August: 
‘Burns was saying on Sunday morning that this meant either unconditional 
neutrality or (leaning over the table, shaking his clenched fists) war with both 
hands… At the end of our meeting J.B. leant forward and in a few words of 
deep feelings said he must separate himself from his colleagues… and from a 
P.M. whom he loved. He was moved to tears.’45   
Similar to Churchill’s case, emotionalism and determination seemed to unite in Burns. 
Morley was evidently less agitated and outspoken, so that colleagues at first 
disbelieved his threat to go. ‘As he had said the same thing about once a month for 3 
years,’ commented Hobhouse, ‘no-one took this very seriously.’46 Morley was more 
torn than Burns perhaps, admitting that resignation was difficult: ‘It concerns a man’s 
principle and creed; it affects confidential relations with fellow-workers; it concerns 
his party…’ When Asquith pleaded for him to stay by playing on his emotions – ‘to 
                                                 
44 Randolph Churchill, ed., Winston Churchill: Companion Volume II, Part 3, 1911-14 (London: 
Heinemann, 1969), 1989-90. 
45 Edward David, ed., Inside Asquith’s Cabinet: from the diaries of Charles Hobhouse (London: John 
Murray, 1977), 179-80. 
46 David, ed., Asquith’s Cabinet, 179-80. 
 17 
lose you in the stress of a great crisis is a calamity which I shudder to contemplate’ – 
Morley felt ‘mental anguish held me by the throat.’ But ultimately, his ‘nerve had 
become as good as usual, my temper as cool’ as he confirmed his wish to go.47 The 
calmest of the trio who departed was Trevelyan, who became distrustful of Grey 
during a meeting in late July. When Trevelyan remarked that there was no reason for 
Britain to become involved in the crisis, Grey, ‘replied in an extraordinarily hard, 
unsympathetic way. He seemed to be coldly angry with me.’ This ‘created a profound 
distrust’ in Trevelyan’s mind. By 2 August, he ‘began to feel rage, and to say that I 
would work at any cost for peace.’ On resigning, he told his wife, ‘It was singularly 
easy to do, as I saw so clearly that I had got to do it.’48  
 
Among the Cabinet ministers who decided to remain in office, some claimed a 
similar ease over their decision. Birrell later recalled, ‘When the fateful decision had 
to be made I was not troubled with any doubt as the course to be taken’, and Samuel 
claimed he ‘spent no sleepless nights weighing up the pros and cons.’49 But other 
minister’s nerves failed, the starkest example being Simon who, like Beauchamp, 
submitted his resignation, then withdrew it. Morley later claimed to have been 
‘specially concerned about Simon’s position. In the Cabinet he was labouring under 
great emotion & tears were in his eyes.’50 By 4 August, Simon was ‘looking terribly 
warn and tired’ and impressed one observer with ‘his utter prostration. Morally and 
physically he was like a man half dead…’ Having withdrawn his resignation, he 
claimed in one conversation that going would have been ‘the easiest course’ and that 
‘by staying… he might do some little good’; while in another, as if searching for 
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excuses, he argued that, if several ministers had resigned, it ‘would necessitate a 
Coalition Government which would assuredly be the grave of Liberalism.’51 His 
change of mind drew contempt from at least one colleague: Hobhouse felt Simon’s 
behaviour ‘almost despicable because he pretended to a special and personal 
abhorrence of killing in any shape.’52 But the many references to Simon’s state of 
mind suggest that the intense stress of the situation prevented him from taking a 
consistent, rational course. 
 
Honour 
One  pressure on Simon was Asquith’s insistence that there was what ‘approaches to a 
public duty’ to stay in office.53 It has already been claimed that, ‘Grey and Asquith 
manipulated the situation deftly, using emotional appeals to British honour… to 
convert the Cabinet’ to intervention.54 Honour, closely associated with emotional 
appeals to duty, loyalty and courage, alongside a condemnation of behaviour that 
smacked of cowardice or betrayal, was a significant element in the male-dominated 
political world of 1914 – and not just in Britain. The phenomenon has already 
received scholarly attention. Avner Offer has argued that the July Crisis was ‘a chain 
of insults that no leader in a position of public visibility could afford to ignore’ and 
that honour codes, viewed by their holders as a tangible possession, helped create a 
situation in which ‘inhibitions against war were dangerously low.’ Ute Frevert has 
emphasised how ‘honor, dishonour and shame… served as powerful… frames of 
reference’ in 1914, allowing leaders to pose as defenders of their country’s 
international reputation. (Frevert also argues that, over the past century, such 
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emotions associated with honour codes have declined in importance, while 
compassion and empathy have become more prominent.) The significance of honour 
for British policy-makers during the July Crisis is underlined by Zachary Twamley, 
who shows it was held in ‘genuine and sincere reverence’ by both interventionists and 
anti-interventionists.55  
 
In Britain, honour was bound up with a belief, probably born of being a 
trading nation, that individuals should fulfil their contractual obligations and here, too, 
a link may be seen between emotion and rational thinking: it made commercial deals 
more certain when merchants knew that agreements would be fulfilled; but the 
fulfilment of contracts – or of international treaties where foreign policy was 
concerned – was then underpinned by emotions associated with adhering to one’s 
word. For Cabinet ministers, ideas of honour were especially significant in the debate 
over British treaty commitments to Belgium, the subject of an 1839 guarantee of 
neutrality by the great powers, as well as to France and Russia, with whom ententes 
had been struck in 1904 and 1907 respectively. On 2 August, with Britain’s decision 
in the balance, French Ambassador Paul Cambon complained ‘I do not even know 
whether this evening the word “honour” will not have to be struck out of the British 
vocabulary.’56 The same day, opposition leaders wrote to Asquith saying, ‘it would be 
fatal to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting 
France and Russia at the present juncture.’ Even professional diplomats were 
privately critical of the Cabinet. Eyre Crowe, Assistant Under-Secretary at the 
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Foreign Office, told his wife, on 1 August, that the Cabinet had ‘finally decided to run 
away, and to desert France in her hour of need.’  At the Foreign Office, he claimed, 
‘practically everyone wants to resign rather than see a government of dishonourable 
cowards’ and he apparently dissuaded five officials from resigning.  Yet, Crowe 
himself believed that, ‘to desert one's post at this hour would be worse dishonour.’57 
 
During the Cabinet meetings of 2 August, Morley discovered, ‘An entente is 
vague, rests on points of honour… here we were confronted by engagements that 
were vast indeed, because indefinite and undefinable…’58 Nonetheless, while 
ministers were prepared to protect France from a German naval attack, they were 
unwilling to give a more general promise to fight and it was Belgium that became the 
focus of debate the following day, a significant point being Lloyd George’s 
announcement that ‘the invasion of a neutral state made all the difference to him…’59 
Churchill was one of those happy to exploit Belgium as justification for war: ‘if we 
allowed Belgian neutrality to be trampled down by Germany… we shd be in a very 
melancholy position both in regard to our interests and our honour.’60 Pease, a 
Quaker, justified his eventual support for war partly through a desire to protect 
Belgium: ‘to repudiate our undertaking to preserve Belgium’s neutrality would be 
dishonourable… it would be a cowardly and selfish act on my part to seek my own 
rest of mind and leave to my colleagues the distasteful and hateful work.’61 He was 
not the only anti-interventionist to defend remaining in office as some kind of 
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emotional sacrifice: Lloyd George complained, ‘I must bear my share of the ghastly 
burden though it scorches my flesh to do so.’62 
 
There were some ways of resisting appeals to honour. In a letter to his 
constituents, Trevelyan declared, ‘Grey’s appeal to “honour” leaves many of us 
untouched’, because ‘it carried with it the duty of enmity to Germany’, while 
Harcourt, after deciding to remain in government, insisted, ‘I have acted not from any 
obligation of Treaty or of honour, for neither existed...’63 An alternative strategy was 
to dismiss honour as an outmoded concept. Trevelyan called it ‘that hateful medieval 
survival’ and Dolly Ponsonby, wife of an anti-war M.P., as a ‘lifeless and academic 
code.’64 Other anti-interventionists – unable perhaps to escape from the cultural 
belief-system that surrounded them – accepted that honour existed, but claimed it did 
not commit Britain to war. Thus, Burns wrote that, ‘Honour, Duty, Humanity all unite 
in my protest against this wanton war’ and Ramsay MacDonald, the Labour leader, 
declared, ‘this country ought to have remained neutral, because… that alone was 
consistent with the honour of the country…’65 Yet, whatever doubts some expressed, 
appeals to honour now became a key factor in motivating parliament and the country 
to fight, as did associated appeals to loyalty and duty. 
 
Loyalty 
It is possible, from the record, to distinguish the role played by appeals to loyalty, 
unity and duty in minimising ministerial resignations, linked to feelings of despair 
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over being separated from former colleagues. Beauchamp recalled that, late in the 2 
August Cabinets,  after said he would resign, ‘Everybody formed in a chorus of 
dissension & the PM spoke forcibly on deserting colleagues, etc.’ Asquith used 
similar tactics against potential resignations the following morning: 
The P.M., whose eyes filled with tears, said… they were men for whom he 
had regard and friendship; the party was still hesitating; the country was in 
danger and unity of counsel was essential.66 
Simon nonetheless submitted a letter of resignation, while conceding that, if the 
country was at war, ‘it was the duty of men like himself and the peace party to support 
the Govt.’ It has already been seen that he later withdrew his resignation, after 
Asquith insisted he had a public duty to remain. Asquith’s ability, not only to remain 
calm, but also to manipulate the emotions of others, is underlined by his generous 
letter to Simon as the latter agonised over the situation: 
‘Whatever decision you come to, I shall always most gratefully and 




Appeals from the Prime Minister evidently carried special weight, because of 
the personal loyalty he commanded. Beauchamp told Asquith, on 3 August, that he 
delayed resignation because of ‘a real anxiety to cooperate as long as possible with 
colleagues & a chief for whom I have a great admiration & respect.’ Burns believed 
that Beauchamp ‘felt as we did but was only persuaded to stay against his better 
judgment by PM’ and Beauchamp admitted to Morley that it felt ‘presumptuous to set 
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up my own opinion against that of one to whom I owe so much allegiance as to the 
Prime Minister.’68 The Prime Minister was aided by other ministers, including Lloyd 
George, who  made ‘a strong appeal to them not to go…’ on 3 August. The power of 
appeals to loyalty and the pain of separation are reflected in Morley’s admission that, 
while he went through with resignation, ‘personal attachments have made the last few 
days truly lacerating.’69  Trevelyan, too, was put under considerable pressure to 
remain in office. Runciman tried to dissuade him from going by depicting those who 
remained as the courageous ones: ‘we decided against at present taking the easy 
course of washing our hands of the dreadful responsibilities…’  When Trevelyan 
persisted, Pease stepped in: ‘I would urge you to recall your resignation & pluckily 
face with our great Prime Minister the responsibilities forced on the Government.’ 
The Chief Whip, Percy Illingworth, similarly declared, ‘At a moment when we are 
fighting for our national existence, this is not the moment to weaken the government 
by resignation.’70 The appeals failed in Trevelyan’s case, but Asquith – pleased with 
the ‘slump in resignations’ on 4 August – could now be contemptuous about ‘Master 
C. Trevelyan… Happily, il n’y a pas d’homme nécessaire.’71 It is a contempt that 
suggests that Asquith’s earlier generosity to the potential departees had been a 
calculated move. 
 
The Prime Minister’s success was probably also aided by the intense passions 
in Cabinet that arose once it was clear that old friendships might be broken – passions 
that undermine the stereotype of the British ‘stiff upper lip.’ Until 2 August, 
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emotional outbursts were few. Asquith even felt the previous day’s Cabinet ‘parted in 
a fairly amicable mood.’72 But, there then followed a general breakdown of male 
stoicism, which included diplomats as well as ministers. On 2 August, Grey told the 
Cabinet that Ambassador Cambon, who had toiled for a decade to build up the entente 
cordiale, ‘had twice wept over our statement that we were not committed.’ Similarly, 
Asquith reported that, when he met the anglophile German Ambassador, Prince 
Lichnowsky, the latter ‘was very agitated poor man & wept’ at the thought of their 
two countries going to war.73 The most dramatic accounts of emotional release, 
however, come from within the Cabinet as serious talked of resignations mounted. 
Harcourt’s journal records that, on 2 August, Burns was ‘almost in tears’ as he 
announced his departure and Lloyd George recalled that Grey ‘burst into tears – an 
extraordinary and moving thing in a man so reserved.’74 Even more charged was the 
morning  session of 3 August, when Asquith reported Burns, Morley and Simon from 
were going and Beauchamp then said he too must leave. As Pease’s account describes 
the scene: 
‘[T]hat is 4 said the P.M. out of our number… God knows I should like to be 
relieved of all this, then he alluded to personal attachment & his indebtedness 
to Morley and broke down… Simon broke down in saying he would do his 
utmost outside to secure unity… Grey said he felt some responsibility for the 
resignations & felt it acutely & broke down.’75 
As Samuel summed it up: ‘The Cabinet was very moving. Most of us could hardly 
speak at all for emotion.’76  
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Even after the resignations were resolved, Asquith was aided by the reluctance 
of Burns and Morley to criticise those who remained. Burns directed his emotions 
towards grief rather than anger, claiming ‘The sadness, badness and madness of it all 
fills me with a merciful condolence rather than a blazing wrath, but the wrath will 
come.’77 Morley showed no bitterness to Beauchamp, who withdrew his resignation: 
‘The pressure for remaining was, I felt myself, so intense, and I have no word of 
reproach for those who hold on.’ (Only later did Morley complain that Harcourt ‘ran 
away at the last moment.’)78 The departing pair may also have found it difficult to 
speak because of the despair expressed by former colleagues, to whom they still felt a 
bond. Hobhouse told Burns, ‘I feel your withdrawal a personal loss’, while Grey 
wrote, ‘I can’t tell you how much I grieve to see your vacant place.’79 In similar 
terms, he told Morley: ‘My heart is too full of all the misery of this time to let me 
write what I feel. I am choked with it.’ With war declared, it was even possible to 
grant that the resignees had behaved well. In expressing his ‘sincere grief at our 
official… parting’ to Morley, Crewe added, ‘I’m not going into our reasons, or into 
what I conceive to be yours: we know that they are all honourable.’ Even the bellicose 
Churchill, having got the conflict he craved, could write that there was ‘no reason for 
anyone to be ashamed of honest and sincere counsel given either to preserve peace or 
to enter upon… war.’80  
 
The Bethmann-Hollweg Letter 
A focus on emotions can help to explain why ministers decided to declare war over 
Belgium on 4 August, despite having decided, at an earlier discussion on 29 July, that 
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the issue was ‘rather one of policy than of legal obligation.’81 One way to explain this 
apparent inconsistency, is to adopt Morley’s argument that, ‘The precipitate and 
peremptory blaze about Belgium was due less to indignation at the violation of a 
Treaty than to natural perception of the plea that it would furnish for intervention on 
behalf of France.’82 Morley’s argument has been echoed in some later analyses.83 But 
the importance of the guarantee has recently been reasserted84 and a focus on 
emotions allows a new – and very different – interpretation of the apparent 
inconsistency. One great difference between the situation on 29 July and 4 August lies 
in rising anger about German actions. In late July, anger tended to focus on Austria-
Hungary, over its war with Serbia: Grey’s accusation of ‘brutal recklessness’, made at 
the opening of the 29 July Cabinet, was echoed by Samuel telling his mother, ‘It is the 
wicked recklessness of Austria that is bringing about this most terrible catastrophe’85 
Harcourt’s journal suggests that the initial discussion about Belgium, before Germany 
went to war, was dry, legalistic and distinctly unemotional: ‘We discussed our 
liabilities for the guarantee of Belgian neutrality & independence which rests on the 
European treaty of 1839. Is it a joint or several guarantee? Are we bound to observe it 
if other parties do not?’86 Only when Germany actually menaced Belgium and other 
neighbours, did emotions fully come into play against it, with Austria falling into the 
background. In his memoirs, Grey recalled being ‘stirred with resentment and 
indignation at what seemed to me Germany’s crime in precipitating the war…’ This 
was no retrospective invention: Samuel met Grey just before a Cabinet meeting and 
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could ‘never forget the passion in his voice as he [said], “There’s some devilry going 
on in Berlin.”.’87  
 
On 1 August, Morley admitted to Sir Almeric Fitzroy, the Clerk of the Privy 
Council, that ‘the high-handed action of Germany was weakening the efforts of the 
peacemakers in the Cabinet…’A number of actions help account for the growing rage 
over German behaviour. Over lunch with Fitzroy, for example, Beauchamp, though 
opposed to going to war, condemned Germany’s sudden detention of some British 
ships as a ‘provocative interference.’88 When Arthur Ponsonby, chair of the anti-
interventionist Liberal Foreign Affairs Group saw Harcourt, on 2 August, he reported 
that many MPs were upset by the invasion of Luxemburg which, like Belgium, was a 
neutral country (though not one Britain was treaty-bound to defend) through which 
the German army intended to advance against France.89  
 
The most provocative German step, however, was a proposal from its 
Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, on 29 July that, if Britain remained 
neutral, Berlin would not annex French territory in Europe and would restore Belgian 
territorial integrity after the war. Grey was said by his Private Secretary, Sir William 
Tyrrell, to be in a ‘white heat of passion’ about this.90 As Sir Eyre Crowe, Assistant 
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, said, there were good rational reasons for 
concern over this proposal, in that it ‘practically admits the intention to violate 
Belgian neutrality.’ But, it also immediately generated a strong emotional response. 
Grey believed the offer ‘dishonouring to Britain’ and had ‘a feeling of despair’ on 
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reading it.91 Rumour of ‘the astonishing German proposal’ spread to M.P.s quickly 
and its impact was still evident on 6 August, when Asquith, moving the Vote of 
Credit for war, declared that the attempt ‘to buy our neutrality’ meant Britain would 
have ‘bartered away our obligation to keep our plighted word’, signifying ‘the 
betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obligations’. Reading the speech – the 
Prime Minister’s principal public justification of war – one might almost consider 
Bethmann’s offer the main reason Britain had for its action, serving as it did to justify 
Asquith’s claim that Britain fought for two principles, ‘that small nationalities are not 
to be crushed… by the arbitrary will of a strong… Power’ and ‘to fulfil a solemn 
international obligation… which, if it had been entered into between private 
persons… would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law, but of honour, 
which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated.’92  
 
True, Bethmann’s offer did not immediately convert the majority to 
intervention. When, in Cabinet on 31 July, Asquith talked of the ‘ingenuous part 
Bethmann-Hollweg had played’, Pease ‘urged… we should do nothing provocative.’ 
But, the Solicitor-General, Sir Stanley Buckmaster, believed that the German offer 
helped ensure that Harcourt, Pease and Simon would ‘stick to the ship.’93 There is 
certainly evidence in Harcourt’s case that Bethmann’s offer aroused a passionate 
response, perhaps paving the way for his change of view over the following days. On 
26 July, Harcourt had told Asquith, ‘under no circ[umstance]s. could I be a party to 
our participation in a European War.’ But, when initial rumours of the German offer 
were heard, he told the Cabinet, ‘it was inconceivable… that we should base our 
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abstention on such a bargain.’ Then, on 30 July, after Bethmann’s proposal was 
officially received, Harcourt described it as ‘shameful’ and was happy that ‘Grey… 
without hesitation rejected offer with (I think) some contumely.’94 In this Harcourt, 
hitherto the leading anti-interventionist was, ironically, at one with the pro-
interventionist Crowe, who considered the German offer ‘most cynical and 
dishonourable.’95 Although his Private Secretary, J.C.C. Davidson, believed the 
Colonial Secretary was ‘passionately opposed’ to war until the last moment, 
Harcourt’s diary shows that, by 2 August, he thought ‘the prevention of a German 
fleet attack & capture of French territory on shore of Channel a British interest’ and 
also agreed with other ministers, ‘to regard any permanent danger or threat to Belg. 
independence (such as occupation) as a vital Brit. interest.’96  
 
That the government’s reaction to the Bethmann-Hollweg proposal was an 
emotional, more than a rational one, is highlighted by the comments made by Grey in 
his memoirs, where he was keen to defend the argument in great speech of 3 August 
as being based upon ‘calm proofs of reasoning’, as might be expected when analysing 
the considered views of a British statesman. He admitted that he initially considered 
reading out Bethmann’s message to the Commons, but explained that idea was 
‘deliberately discarded’, because it ‘would tend to stir indignation, and the House 
ought to come to its decision on grounds of weight, not of passion.’ He also knew 
that, whenever the government did decide to publish the Chancellor’s proposal, ‘it 
would no doubt strengthen feeling.’97 This presumably explains why Asquith 
exploited it in his own speech a few days later. The actual invasion of Belgium on 4 
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August could only deepen the despair over German behaviour. As late as 2 August, 
one Liberal backbencher ‘could not believe that a liberal Government can be guilty of 
the crime of dragging us into this conflict’, but a few days later he wrote: ‘when 
Germany decided on an unprovoked attack upon Belgium, whose neutrality Germany 
equally with ourselves had guaranteed, it seemed impossible for us to stand by.’ 
Birrell later asked, ‘Can it be fairly said that we were wrong in the rage that an act, so 
significant of the temper of the German War Lords… raised in our breasts?’98  
 
Looked at from an emotional perspective, then, the July Crisis may justify the 
argument of Valentine Chirol, former foreign correspondent of The Times, that Britain 
was moved, ‘not by a generous sense of our obligations… but by the inexorable 
pressure of Germany’s open contempt of all our interests and susceptibilities.’99 It is 
this that explains why the invasion of Belgium drove the British government to war 
on 4 August, when the hypothetical discussion of 29 July suggested that ministers 
might evade the 1839 guarantee. By 4 August the Belgian question was no longer a 
dry, legal one, but surrounded by rising anger at German aggression and fear of 
dishonour; indeed, it the marriage between supposed contractual obligation and moral 




For Cabinet ministers the July Crisis was a searing experience. It could hardly be 
otherwise given the universality of emotions and their integral role in human decision-
making, as well as the rapid development of the crisis, the pressure of meetings and 
                                                 
98 David Dutton, ed., Odyssey of an Edwardian Liberal: the political diary of Richard Durning Holt 
(Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1989), 33-4; Birrell, Things Past, 234. 
99 Cambridge University Library, Charles Hardinge papers, Vol. 93, Chirol to Hardinge, 4 August. 
 31 
the great issues at stake. As Masterman put it, ‘It was a company of tired men who for 
twelve hot summer nights, without rest or relaxation, had devoted their energies to 
avert this thing… No one who has been through the experience… will ever be quite 
the same again.’100 Ministers were themselves aware of the value of emotional 
appeals to M.P.s and the public; they made similar appeals to one another in terms of 
honour, duty, loyalty and courage; but they were also, each of them, subject to 
emotions as individuals. At a dinner 2 August, Ramsay Macdonald recognised that the 
varied emotions felt by three ministers might be more significant than the rational 
arguments they rehearsed: ‘Masterman jingo, George ruffled, Simon broken. George 
harped on exposed French coasts & Belgium but I gathered that excuses were being 
searched for.’101 Grey later acknowledged that, during the crisis, ‘considerations 
worked in my mind by flashes of instinct… rather than by calm proofs of 
reasoning.’102 Yet, in a century of study, historians have barely touched on the 
potential value of such an insight for re-interpreting the July Crisis.   
 
The argument here is not that rational decision-making lacked importance or 
was somehow ‘trumped’ by emotionalism: careful discussion of British legal 
commitments clearly took up a significant amount of Cabinet debate. But rationalism 
operated alongside emotion and it can be difficult to separate them, especially when 
concepts like honour, loyalty and duty are raised. The Belgian guarantee and French 
entente, two issues at the centre of Cabinet debate, drew together questions of national 
interest, not least the security of the English Channel, and honour which, in the British 
sense, was tied to the fulfilment of contractual obligations. But a key argument here 
has been that honour, while a valuable route into grasping the importance of 
                                                 
100 Lucy Masterman, C.F.G. Masterman: a biography (London: Nicholson and Watson, 1939), 266. 
101 MacDonald Papers, PRO30/69/1753/1, diary, 23 September. 
102 Grey, Twenty-Five Years, II, 15. 
 32 
emotions, does not draw out their full significance. There was also a rising level of 
anger – probably the most important single feeling driving Britain towards war – over 
German behaviour. In late July, most ministers were reluctant to risk war for France, 
while their initial, legalistic discussion of the 1839 guarantee failed to stir the blood. 
But strong feelings of anger, shame and betrayal were stirred by other issues, most 
important being Bethmann-Hollweg’s cack-handed offer of a neutrality deal, which 
Grey recognised as having a primarily emotional impact. These paved the way for the 
situation in which Germany’s actual invasion of Belgium allowed many former anti-
interventionists, including Lloyd George, to approve Grey’s 3 August Commons 
speech. A few still chose to resign, but they departed quietly, refusing to explain 
themselves in the Commons. The former Conservative premier, Arthur Balfour, 
graciously conceded that Asquith ‘managed his Party & his Government with extreme 
dexterity’103 and part of this management was a sound understanding of human 
emotions, as well as an almost ruthless ability to manipulate them: Asquith was cool 
under pressure, knew how to appeal to duty and readily welcomed back Beauchamp 
and Simon. 
 
Emotions may be interpreted alongside more precise developments, as part of 
the ‘march of events’ that Churchill, on 31 July, predicted would carry Britain into 
war.104 They helped keep most of the Cabinet together, as reflected in Samuel’s 
complaint that those who those who resigned ‘have no right to abandon us at this 
crisis – it is a failure of courage.’105 They also helped justify war, as with Grey’s 
insistence in his speech 3 August speech that, ‘If, in a crisis like this, we run away 
from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian Treaty, I doubt 
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whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be very much 
value in the face of the respect that we should have lost.’106 Rather than emotions 
somehow distorting rational decision-making for a short time, then, a look at their 
impact on British decision-making in 1914, confirms that they were constantly 
present, an integral part of reality, even if they affected different individuals in 
different ways and varied in their mix and force over time. It may be that individuals 
rationalised decisions, as they were culturally expected to do when, actually, they 
were at least as deeply affected by emotions, as suggested by Simon’s search for 
excuses after his nerves failed over resignation. On some issues, not least reactions to 
the Bethmann-Hollweg proposal, the emotional reaction felt by politicians and 
officials seems to have been more significant than any rational response. 
 
One serious problem for historians, in trying to trace the impact of emotions 
on past events, is that actors themselves may hide their feelings and prefer to portray 
themselves as acting for rational reasons. This is certainly a problem in the July 
Crisis. The telegrams and memoranda that reflect Foreign Office decision-making are 
almost always written in cold, objective tones and, even when one turns to more 
personal sources, such as the detailed diaries of Harcourt and Pease, it can be difficult 
to trace the emotions they felt as the crisis unfolded. Emotional evidence is thin on 
some of the nineteen Cabinet members, like Hobhouse and Masterman, even thinner 
on Birrell, Crewe and McKenna, totally absent on the Secretary for Scotland, 
McKinnon Wood. But the problem is not an insurmountable one and this article 
demonstrates that it is possible for historians of British foreign policy to factor 
emotions into their accounts. A range of emotions was on display, including sadness 
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and dismay over the decision for war, but with some of the strongest feelings being 
anger and betrayal over German behaviour, and loyalty and duty towards colleagues.  
The feelings of most ministers are betrayed to some extent in the written record, 
especially in personal sources like diaries, letters and memoirs, if only to demonstrate 
that a few, like Asquith, had excellent self-control while others, like Simon, became 
animated and unpredictable.  It is possible to discern the bellicosity of Churchill, the 
changeability of Lloyd George and the increasing strain on Grey. Among the three 
ministers who resigned, one can compare Burns’ agitated determination, Morley’s 
pain and Trevelyan’s single-mindedness. Viewed in this way, engagement with the 
‘emotional turn’ may even reinforce traditional areas of international history, 
deepening an interest in individual biographies as revealed in the written record, while 
allowing old debates on a range of negotiations, relationships and crises to be 
refreshed.  
